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Abstract 
This paper considers the paradoxical co-existence of a productivity slowdown and exciting new 
technologies.  Several potential explanations are reviewed.  It is argued that while some are 
unpersuasive it is too soon to know which carry the most weight.  However, the slowdown does not 
appear to be an artefact of the data.  A key, hotly disputed, issue is the future economic impact of 
today’s technological progress.  As with previous general purpose technologies, it is likely that there 
will be powerful effects but only with a lag.  This has the implication that while the slowdown is real 
it is not necessarily permanent. 
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I. Introduction 
A surprising and worrying feature of the economic environment in the advanced economies in 
recent years has been slow productivity growth.  The slowdown started before the financial crisis 
and weak performance has continued through the last ten years.  Estimates of trend growth are now 
more pessimistic and projections of future economic growth have become less optimistic.  Yet, at 
the same time, there is a great deal of excitement (or possibly angst) about quite dramatic 
technological change in the context of developments in artificial intelligence, the digital revolution 
and robotics. 
This paper considers various possible (not mutually exclusive) ways to resolve this paradox.  The 
explanations for this co-existence of rapid technological advance and disappointing growth that are 
reviewed include the following. 
 Economic growth is faster than is captured by the national income accounts and this 
discrepancy has increased in the age of the digital economy. 
 Even if the productivity slowdown is real, recent performance may not be a good guide to 
medium-term trend growth prospects. 
 The financial crisis has had and continues to have a significant adverse effect on productivity 
growth but eventually there will be a return to business as usual. 
 The problem is declining business dynamism which offsets the positive impact of new 
technologies. 
 Important new technologies have a strong impact on productivity only after a significant 
time lag. 
 The new technologies may seem impressive but their economic impact is and will be 
modest; they will not match the ‘great inventions’ of the past. 
 The productivity of R and D has declined and across the whole economy new ideas have 
become harder to find. 
The first two of these explanations relate to the quality of the evidence for a sustained productivity 
slowdown while the last five take the slowdown to be real and seek to understand why it has 
happened despite the apparent potential of exciting new technologies. 
It should be said straightaway that it is not at all clear what the right answer is but some of these 
hypotheses do seem more plausible than others.  The issue is important because it has a strong 
bearing on what is to be believed about growth prospects over the medium term.  The evidence that 
is examined largely relates to the United States partly because the literature is much richer but also 
because, as the economy at the frontier, its prospects matter a lot. 
II. Recent Productivity Growth 
An overview of the experience of labour productivity growth in the EU15 and the United States is 
given in Table 1.  Real GDP per hour worked in the EU15 fell substantially in successive periods prior 
to the crisis.  The rapid catch-up growth of the early post-war decades was superseded by strong if 
not spectacular growth until the mid-1990s but then fell to a rather disappointing performance in 
the pre-crisis new economy years.  The recent past, during and after the crisis, has amounted to a 
‘lost decade’.  The United States as the leading economy has had a somewhat different history.  
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Strong productivity growth up to the early 1970s was followed by a marked slowdown but then 
there was a notable revival around the turn of the century which had, however, already waned 
before the crisis.  The crisis years were difficult but productivity growth held up better than in 
Europe. 
Current mainstream projections for medium-term growth in the United States and Western Europe 
are also displayed in Table 1.  Although recovery from the dismal performance of the last few years 
is envisaged, the scaling down of projected growth compared with pre-2007 is quite marked.  
Compared with growth during the years 1995-2007, future American and European growth of real 
GDP per person is seen as likely to be halved or worse.  In each case, a serious weakening of labour 
productivity growth is also expected. 
It is also useful to consider the sources of economic growth.  Standard growth accounting methods 
are used to do this in Table 2.  In these estimates, TFP growth is obviously of interest since it is 
impacted by technological progress.  In a pure textbook setting that is all it would entail.  Here it is 
obtained as a residual and could also reflect improvements in the efficiency of input use, economies 
of scale or changes in capacity utilization.  In particular, the very rapid TFP growth in Europe prior to 
1973 benefited considerably from a transitory phase of improving efficiency in a context of catch-up 
growth.  Similarly, the lack of TFP growth in recent years is surely influenced by the effects of the 
crisis working through misallocation of resources and excess capacity.  Nevertheless, the decline and 
fall of TFP growth is striking and intensifies the productivity paradox. 
An important reason for pessimism about future growth prospects is econometric evidence based 
on various time-series methods that trend growth of labour productivity and TFP both in Europe and 
also in the United States is now considerably lower than at the start of the 21st century.  For 
example, Table 3 displays estimates made by a team of OECD economists.  The implication is that 
recent experience is not just a temporary slowdown but that productivity growth prospects are 
much worse than 15 years ago. 
III. Does Real GDP Measure Growth Well? 
One way to explain the co-existence of slow growth and apparently rapid technological change 
might be that growth is under-estimated by the national income accounts either because they are 
conceptually inadequate or because GDP is not well estimated.1  These problems are, of course, not 
new although they may well have increased as the digital revolution has progressed.  However, if 
they are to explain the productivity slowdown rather than account for a continuing tendency for 
growth to be faster than stated in the Blue Book, then they must have become much more serious in 
a short space of time. 
Compiling estimates of GDP in current prices has undoubtedly become more challenging in the 
digital age (Ahmad and Schreyer, 2016; Bean, 2016).  Problems include collecting data on the sharing 
economy, taking account of digital services which are not directly paid for, and dealing with the 
                                                          
1 For example, it is well-known that conventional measurement of TFP growth does not take account of the 
use of natural capital in production.  In principle, if this slowed down, then measured TFP growth would fall. In 
practice, this does not seem likely to explain the TFP slowdown in the United States since the adjustment to 
measured TFP growth for the use of natural capital is small – on average plus 0.02 percentage points per year 
during 1986-2008 (Brandt et al., 2017). 
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movement of activities across the boundary from market to home production.  The first of these is a 
question of tracking transactions that are prone to disappear into the shadow economy and the 
second could be addressed (imperfectly) by assuming that the value added can be approximated by 
advertising expenditures that finance their production or finding ingenious methods to infer the user 
valuation of these services.  An alternative way of valuing consumption of internet services is by 
estimating the value of time spent online and this might also be used to monetize home production.  
In every case, however, estimates are subject to large margins of error.   
In the case of home production, there are good reasons for not including it in GDP if this is intended 
to be a measure of market-sector economic activity that is useful for macroeconomic policy.  If, on 
the other hand, the aim is to measure changes in economic welfare then, for example, incremental 
consumer surplus from time spent online is a component that should be captured and indeed may 
be an important aspect of the benefits of recent technological advance. 
A further set of issues arise when trying to measure the growth of real GDP through time because of 
the difficulties of deflating estimates in current prices into constant prices.  These are in large part a 
consequence of technological change together with the quality change and new goods and services 
that it delivers.  There is general agreement that inflation tends to be over-estimated and, 
accordingly, real GDP growth is under-estimated, possibly quite significantly, by the practices 
currently used by government statistical offices.  The literature which mainly concerns the United 
States, has, for example, highlighted not taking quality change in most of the economy seriously 
(Feldstein, 2017), the use of inappropriate imputation of prices where old goods are replaced by 
new goods (Aghion et al, 2017), and failures adequately to track declines in the prices of IT 
equipment and IT services (Byrne and Corrado, 2017). 
It is not difficult to think that technological progress is responsible for the growth rate of real GDP in 
the United States to be perhaps 1 percentage point per year faster than officially stated.  
Mismeasurement of real GDP growth does not, however, explain much if any of the productivity 
slowdown.  This is because the problems outlined above are not new and, in some cases, were more 
serious in earlier years, or their impact is too small to account for much of the productivity shortfall 
(Byrne et al., 2016).  Thus, the ‘missing growth’ estimated by Aghion et al. (2017) rose from 0.52 in 
1983-2005 to 0.69 per cent per year in 2006-13 compared with a decrease in real GDP growth from 
2.06 to 1.59 per cent per year while the corrections to ICT prices proposed by Byrne and Corrado 
(2017) would add 0.4 percentage points to American growth between 1995 and 2006 but only 0.2 
percentage points between 2006 and 2015. 
On top of this it is interesting also to consider the incremental consumer surplus from internet 
services which surely contributes to growth of living standards even though it would be counted 
conventionally as adding to home production rather than GDP.  A number of studies for the United 
States based on a variety of methodologies are reviewed and updated by Syverson (2017).  They 
mostly indicate a missing welfare gain of between 2.5 and 5 per cent of the shortfall in American 
GDP in 2015 relative to its size if labour productivity growth had continued at the pre-2005 rate.  By 
far the largest estimate of the consumer-surplus gain is derived using estimates of time spent on 
internet use valued at the average wage and this amounts to $842 billion for the ten years to 2015.  
This would be an impressive contribution to increasing living standards but is surely an upper 
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bound.2  Even so, it is less than a third of the $2.7 trillion shortfall from the productivity slowdown.3  
Put another way, adding it into GDP would raise productivity growth by about 0.4 percent points per 
year during 2005-15 compared with a slowdown of 1.3 percentage points.4 
In other words, measurement issues can help to explain part of the new productivity paradox.  Real 
GDP growth is significantly understated by the national accounts and, as is always the case, some of 
the welfare gains from technological change occur outside the scope of GDP.  However, it seems 
unlikely that mismeasurement plays a large part in the recent marked decline in productivity growth.  
The evidence relates to the United States but there is every reason to think that the same analysis 
also applies to the UK. 
IV. Is Productivity Growth Predictable? 
Technological change is the ultimate source of sustained growth of labor productivity and thus of 
long-run increases in living standards.  In a conventional neoclassical growth model, it will be 
represented by the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).  Here the rate of growth of the capital 
stock is endogenous and, in the steady state, is equal to the exogenous natural rate of growth.  Thus, 
a rise in the TFP growth rate induces capital accumulation and the steady-state rate of labour 
productivity growth is proportional to TFP growth.  So, for projections of the rate of growth of 
potential output, the future TFP growth rate is the fundamental building block.  In a world-leading 
economy (United States) this will be largely based on domestic innovative activity but in follower 
economies (Western Europe) mainly on technology transfer to exploit opportunities arising from TFP 
growth at the frontier. 
Crafts and Mills (2017) find that a forecast of TFP growth for the United States business sector based 
on estimated trends over the previous 20- or 25-year window exhibits considerable variation and 
does not show monotonic decreases.5  From a level around 2 per cent at the start of the 1970s, 
these forecasts are generally falling until they reach lows of about 0.5 per cent at times in the 1990s 
before rising to about 1.2 per cent in the mid-2000s, and then falling back to 1990s levels more 
recently.  Average realized TFP growth (adjusted for capacity utilization) over 10 year intervals – the 
horizon for which the Congressional Budget Office makes projections – has also varied substantially 
over time.  The outturn fell from 2.0 per cent per year or a little less for intervals starting in the 
1960s to 0.5 per cent per year or a little more for intervals from the early-1970s to the late 1980s.  It 
then rose to a peak of 2.0 per cent in the mid-1990s for the years encompassing the height of the 
‘new economy’ before falling back to below 0.5 per cent per year for the period of the financial crisis 
and its aftermath. 
If future American TFP growth is a key determinant of future trend labour productivity growth in 
Europe, how easy is it to forecast and is recent trend TFP growth a good guide to future medium-
                                                          
2 The estimate is obtained by updating Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) using ‘expansive assumptions’. 
3 A subsequent paper looks in detail at the value of the user data obtained by Facebook and of the fees that 
Wikipedia could extract through charges for subscribers and concludes that together they would account for 
less than 0.1 per cent of GDP in 2016 (Ahmad et al., 2017). 
4 Bean (2016) suggests that if a similar method is applied to the UK the addition to productivity growth would 
be 0.66 percentage points per year.  This is substantial but much less than the slowdown recorded in Table 2. 
5 These forecasts are derived using a basic unobserved component model where trend growth follows a 
random walk and the noise is a first order autoregression.  This is estimated on the basis of the historical data 
up to that point; for details see Crafts and Mills (2017). 
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term performance?  As Figure 1 underlines, the answers are ‘extremely difficult’ and ‘definitely not’.  
The 10-year-ahead projection for TFP growth which graphs the average TFP growth rate over the 
next ten years shows considerable variability within a range from 2.0 to 0.3 per cent per year.  Also 
plotted in the graph are estimates of trend TFP growth at the same point in time.  Forecasting on 
this basis would have missed the productivity slowdown of the 1970s, the ‘new-economy’ 
acceleration of the mid-1990s, and the slowdown of recent years – in other words, all the major 
episodes during the period! 
The implication is that an econometric estimate of low trend productivity growth currently does not 
necessarily rule out a productivity surge in the near future.6  The precedent of the 1990s is witness 
to this.  Econometrics is inherently backward looking and gives no weight to information about 
future technological progress.  A techno-optimist should not feel too dismayed by the results of 
time-series analysis. 
V. Is the Financial Crisis to Blame? 
Another way to resolve the slow growth with rapid technological change paradox might be to 
suppose that adverse effects of the financial crisis have damaged the economy and offset or 
postponed the impact of new technologies.  It is well-known that financial crises can have 
permanent effects on the level of potential output.  Thinking in terms of a production function or 
growth accounting, there may be an impact on capital inputs as investment is interrupted, on human 
capital if skills are lost, on labour inputs through increases in equilibrium unemployment, and on TFP 
if R & D is cut back or if innovative firms cannot get finance. 
The transition period while the levels effect materializes, and during which growth rates are 
depressed, may be quite long.  Moreover, recovery is often slow; Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) 
estimated that the median length of time before real GDP per person returns to its pre-crisis level is 
6.5 years.  This could imply that recent labour productivity performance partly reflects a levels effect 
resulting from the financial crisis.  Oulton and Sebastia-Barrel (2017) found a long-run impact on the 
level of labour productivity of 1.1 per cent per year that the crisis lasts.   An analysis by OECD 
economists found that the median post-2007 decline in potential output in OECD countries affected 
by a banking crisis had reached 5.5 per cent by 2014 compared with 2 per cent in countries which 
did not have such a crisis (Ollivaud and Turner, 2015). 
There is also good reason to think that the crisis has had significant temporary effects on 
productivity performance which compounded earlier weakness and which may not yet have 
completely evaporated.  There is evidence that the crisis had led to some impairment of resource 
reallocation which has decreased efficiency (and thus TFP), as well as holding back implementation 
of innovations thus exacerbating the productivity slowdown.  For the UK the main channel may be 
misallocation of labour as new hires and employment growth have been disproportionately 
concentrated in low productivity sectors with the implication that as much as two-thirds of the 
shortfall in labour productivity (compared with a pre-crisis projection) may be explained (Patterson 
et al., 2016). 
                                                          
6 Estimates of trends at the end of the sample period with no future observations in the data set are 
notoriously unreliable as has been apparent in attempts to track the output gap in real-time; see for example, 
Watson (2007) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002).  
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There is evidence of misallocation of capital in some European countries linked to higher barriers to 
entry and exit resulting from costly credit, regulations, and uncertainty which has had a cumulative 
adverse impact on TFP growth in 2012 of about a quarter in Spain and almost a half in France 
(Gamberoni et al., 2016).  The delayed exit of zombie firms has also had a small negative effect on 
the level of TFP of about 0.6 percentage points on average in 2011  (Adalat McGowan et al., 2017).  
TFP growth has fallen by a significantly larger amount across OECD countries in firms which entered 
the crisis with weak balance sheets and were exposed to a greater interruption to credit supply; 
Duval et al. (2017) estimate that this could account for as much as a third of the reduction in TFP 
growth with an impact that persisted through at least 2013. 
Evidence of the implications of the financial crisis for productivity performance is gradually mounting 
but a full audit is not yet available.  It is, however, clear that the crisis and its aftermath complicate 
understanding of productivity performance.  The end-sample estimation of trend growth which is 
always problematic becomes still more difficult.  Even so, there are good reasons to think that the 
crisis has led to a period of prolonged but nevertheless at least partly transitory weakness which 
may be conducive to undue pessimism about future prospects. 
VI. Is the Productivity Slowdown Due to Declining Business Dynamism? 
The pre-crisis slowdown in TFP growth was widespread across the American economy.  It affected all 
regions (Cardarelli and Lusinyan, 2015) and most sectors.  While a reduction in the contribution of 
ICT to overall TFP growth was certainly not trivial it only accounted for about a third of the post-2004 
slowdown (Byrne et al., 2013).  This suggests that the standard explanations for the productivity 
slowdown, which are based on a decline in the rate of technological progress reflected in slowing 
TFP growth pre-crisis subsequently exacerbated by side-effects of the crisis, may be incomplete or 
even misleading.  It may be important to look closely at the contribution of decreases in the 
efficiency with which resources were reallocated to new uses which could dampen or even offset 
the favourable impact of new technologies. 
This idea is central to an alternative hypothesis to explain the slowdown, namely, that it largely 
reflects ‘declining business dynamism’, i.e., the process of entry, exit, expansion and contraction of 
enterprises which might also be described as creative destruction.  The symptoms of the problem 
are declining rates of business start-ups, job reallocation, and the share of employment in young 
firms.  All these indicators have experienced a continual significant decline since the 1980s 
(Haltiwanger, 2017).  Decker et al. (2017), who are advocates of declining dynamism, perform an 
accounting decomposition of the growth of labour productivity which attributes the (pre-crisis) 
slowdown between the late-1990s and the mid-2000s to much smaller contributions from entry of 
new firms and the covariance of employment shares and productivity growth among continuing 
firms.7  It must be emphasized that this exercise does not show that declining dynamism caused the 
productivity slowdown – for example, it does not rule out reverse causality.  Since the underlying 
reasons for declining dynamism are not explained it is also not clear what policy response would be 
appropriate. 
If business dynamism has declined with adverse consequences for productivity growth, what might 
be the explanation?  The most obvious candidates are decreases in competition and increasing 
                                                          
7 The methodology employed by Decker et al. (2017) is a dynamic Olley-Pakes decomposition. 
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regulation both of which are clearly visible in the recent past.  The Herfindahl index of industrial 
concentration rose in 70 per cent of American industries between 1987 and 2007 and by at least 20 
per cent in 56 per cent of industries (Peltzman, 2014).  De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) found that 
the average price-cost mark-up for publicly traded firms in the United States rose from 1.18 to 1.67 
between 1980 and 2014 and tended to rise across all sectors.  Weaker competition would seem to 
be a possible explanation for declining dynamism but the link remains to be demonstrated.   
Measures of regulatory stringency in the ‘RegData’ database show substantial increases in many 
sectors since the mid 1980s (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin, 2017).  However, regression analysis based 
on these data rejects the hypothesis that regulatory stringency is responsible for the symptoms of 
declining dynamism (Goldschlag and Tabarrok, 2015).  Similarly, panel regressions show no impact of 
regulatory stringency on TFP growth at the industry level (Fernald et al., 2017).  So, the evidence is 
against claims that stricter regulation explains either declining dynamism or the productivity 
slowdown. 
In sum, it is important to recognize that the economic impact of technological advance depends on 
the actions of firms informed by incentive structures, as is evidenced by the sorry example of many 
European countries during the ICT revolution (Cette and Lopez, 2012).  If there has been a 
permanent reduction in business dynamism in the United States, this might partly explain the 
productivity paradox but it is too soon to tell.8  The evidence for a causal relationship has not yet 
been established nor is there a good explanation for declining dynamism.9 
VII. Does the Productivity Impact of a GPT Arrive Straightaway? 
A General Purpose Technology (GPT) has been defined as ‘a single generic technology, recognizable 
as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes 
to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many spillover effects’ (Lipsey et al., 2005, p. 98).  
Famous examples include steam, electricity and ICT.  Perhaps artificial intelligence, machine learning 
and robotics will come to be seen as a GPT in due course. 
As is suggested by the definition, the impact of a GPT on productivity typically is modest initially but 
then increases over time.  This is implied by the arithmetic of growth accounting, which is set out in 
the notes to Table 4, since β and ω will be very small in the early days.  At a deeper level, the reasons 
for the lags include improvements to the technology over time which increase its range of 
applications, reductions in the quality-adjusted price of the capital equipment in which it is 
embodied, and the time taken to implement complementary investments in organizational change. 
The examples of electricity and steam illustrate some of these points.  The big impact of electricity in 
the United States came in the 1920s about 40 years after Thomas Edison first distributed electrical 
                                                          
8 The major research project on management quality (Bloom et al., 2016) has demonstrated conclusively that it 
has a strong effect on productivity performance which might raise the question as to whether declining quality 
of management is a candidate to explain the productivity slowdown in the United States.  These authors have 
not published data on changes over time in the quality of management and their surveys were not really 
designed to address this question.  However, the evidence such as it is does not suggest that a deterioration in 
management quality is a plausible explanation (personal communication from John van Reenen, October 
2017). 
9 It should also be noted that there was a surge, albeit temporary, in TFP growth in the 1990s at a time when 
the symptoms of declining dynamism were already showing up. 
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power in New York in 1882.  The productivity gains came from the redesign of American factories 
which electricity facilitated but took time to be recognized and implemented and were realized 
through TFP spillovers (David, 1991).10  The impact of steam power on productivity growth in Britain 
was negligible prior to 1830 when only 165,000 horsepower was in use even though James Watt’s 
patent was issued in 1769 (Crafts, 2004).  The cost effectiveness and diffusion of steam power was 
held back by the high coal consumption of the original low-pressure engines and the move to high 
pressure – which benefited not only factories but railways and steam ships - was not generally 
accomplished until the second half of the 19th century.  The science of the steam engine was not well 
understood and the price of steam power fell very slowly, especially before about 1850. 
Table 4 compares the impact of the three most famous GPTs.  The estimates reflect delays before 
maximum impact on productivity growth rates.  The eventual impacts are substantial in each case.  
The price falls recorded in the table can be thought of as a measure of the rate of improvement of 
the technology which means that ICT was much faster than electricity which in turn was much faster 
than steam.  Arguably, western societies have been getting better at exploiting new technological 
opportunities so that the impacts are felt more quickly.  This would perhaps not be surprising in the 
context of superior scientific and technological capabilities, greater expenditure on R and D, and 
more sophisticated capital markets. 
The economic impact of important new technologies takes time to materialize and the full effect is 
certainly not felt straightaway.  It is quite possible that their contribution to annual productivity 
growth is always modest even though their cumulative impact is large.  A possible resolution of the 
current productivity paradox may well entail the timing of the economic effects of technologies 
which are already visible but have not yet fully matured. 
VIII. Is the Problem Not Matching the Economic Impact of the ‘Great Inventions’? 
A possible explanation for the productivity paradox is that there is a great deal of much-noticed 
innovative activity but it will have only a relatively weak economic impact, i.e, only a modest effect 
on TFP growth or labour productivity growth.  This view has been strongly advocated by Gordon 
(2016) who argues that the phase of rapid American TFP growth in the 20th century was based on 
the ‘great inventions’ of the second industrial revolution, that nothing of similar importance is likely 
in the near future, and that whatever potential new technologies like robotics have will continue 
only be realized slowly so that the rate of productivity growth will not be raised very much. 
Gordon sees TFP growth of about 0.4 per cent per year in the business sector over the next 25 years.  
This is a stark contrast with Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), the ‘techno-optimists’ who stress the 
potential of artificial intelligence and big data and expect TFP growth of at least 2.0 per cent per 
year.  This makes the point that taking into account assessments of future technological outcomes 
can led to a wide range of projections for future productivity growth very different what might result 
from econometric analysis of past performance. 
                                                          
10 In principle, unremunerated TFP spillover effects are distinct from the capital-deepening contribution to 
labour productivity growth from investment in new forms of capital goods which embody the GPT. They 
essentially represent externalities, for example, in the form of learning effects which enhance TFP.  In practice, 
they are hard to measure and are omitted from nearly all growth accounting studies hence their appearance in 
only one row of Table 4. 
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Gordon’s claims about the past and future of ‘great inventions’ both deserve to be challenged.  With 
regard to the future, several serious research studies see substantial productivity potential in new 
technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics which they expect to materialize in the next 
20 years or so.  Frey and Osborne (2017) estimated that 47 per cent of 2010 employment in the 
United States has at least a 70 per cent chance of being computerized by 2035.  Future advances will 
come in machine learning which will be applied in mobile robotics as hitherto non-routine tasks are 
turned into well-defined problems, in particular using big data which will allow substitution of (much 
cheaper) robots for labour in a wide range of low-wage service occupations.  Arntz et al. (2016) 
consider tasks rather than occupations and see relatively few jobs (perhaps 9 per cent) as 
completely automatable but, nevertheless, estimate that between 35 and 45 per cent of tasks in 
OECD countries will be susceptible of automatibility.  If either of these estimates is correct, the 
upside is that this technology alone could deliver labour productivity gains equivalent to, say, 1.5 per 
cent per year over the next 20 years.  A wider perspective which encompasses driverless cars, 
universal multi-jointed robots and data-driven expert systems sees labour productivity growth of 2.5 
per cent per year as attainable in Europe (Bartelsman, 2013). 
A recent paper quantifies sectoral contributions to American TFP growth before World War II 
(Bakker et al., 2017).  It concludes that the great inventions made a strong but not dominant 
contribution.  Their absolute impact was actually not very different from the IT sectors in the last 40 
years while the proportion of TFP growth that they contributed was lower (see Table 5).11  Compared 
with recent years, the striking feature of the pre-war American economy is actually how broadly-
based TFP growth was and how much accrued from the non-great-invention sectors. 
So, great inventions do matter but they do not make all the difference and they may not all be in the 
past.  A great-inventions perspective on productivity growth is misleading; a substantial component 
of TFP growth comes from mundane real cost reduction as Harberger (1998) reminded us.  
Nevertheless, if we do consider the prospects for exciting new technologies to come on stream in 
the next couple of decades, it seems fair to say that Gordon’s pessimism is not widely shared and 
that the stronger evidence has been produced by researchers who see the potential for significant 
and rapid productivity advance. 
IX. Does Declining Productivity of R and D mean that there is No Escape from the 
Productivity Slowdown? 
Something which is not to blame for the productivity slowdown in advanced economies is a 
reduction in expenditure on R & D (cf. Table 6).  On average in the last 50 years, the United States 
has spent about 2.5 per cent of GDP on R & D but while research effort has been sustained 
productivity growth has fallen.  This is in stark contrast to the predictions of endogenous growth 
models such as that of Romer (1990) where in the long-run TFP growth is proportional to research 
intensity.  An obvious implication is that a simplistic solution of tackling the productivity slowdown 
with increased subsidies to R & D is unlikely to be successful. 
                                                          
11 The calculations reported in Table 6 offer two variants depending on whether distribution is classified as a 
great-invention sector (as Gordon does) or not.  Gordon’s classification appears to be based on the assumption 
that TFP growth in this sector relied on spillovers from the development of motor transport which allowed 
supermarkets to replace corner stores.  This would presumably be an upper bound and the sector would not 
be included in a conventional account of the inventions of the second industrial revolution.  
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Not surprisingly, an econometric analysis of recent American experience rejects the endogenous 
growth hypothesis but finds support for a semi-endogenous growth model in which there are 
diminishing returns to R & D so that raising the rate of investment in R & D only has a levels effect on 
income per person (Kruse-Andersen, 2017).12 Over the long run, growth in employment (which 
increases the knowledge base of the economy) is the only source of endogenous growth.  If the 
insights of this analysis are accepted, then it has quite severe future implications.  It suggests that 
the productivity slowdown reflects the ending of transitory boosts to productivity growth from past 
increases in R & D intensity and will be permanent in the context of falling employment growth.13 
The long-run American experience of lower TFP growth combined with increased research intensity 
has been interpreted by Bloom et al. (2017) as a signal that it is increasingly difficult to find new 
ideas – the ideas production function is subject to severely diminishing returns.  They estimate that 
this history implies that for the economy as a whole the number of researchers has to double every 
13 years just to maintain TFP growth at a constant rate.  They note interesting examples of the 
phenomenon at the micro level, the most striking of which is that it now takes 15 times more 
researchers than in the early 1970s to maintain Moore’s Law.14 
If this interpretation is correct and nothing changes, then the future for productivity growth is bleak 
– less favourable than even Gordon supposes.  It is not just that there are no ‘great inventions’ 
around at the moment but that we should not expect much TFP growth at all in future.  Fortunately, 
there are reasons to be more optimistic. 
The key issue with regard to the past is whether it is misleading to equate TFP growth with 
technological progress or the growth of ideas.  While this might be valid on the basis of textbook 
assumptions, in practice changes in measured TFP growth may be affected by the incidence of scale 
economies, changes in allocative efficiency, or variations in the extent to which the conventional 
assumptions used to infer TFP growth are inaccurate (Crafts and Mills, 2005).  If TFP growth has been 
undermined by a loss of dynamism, this would also make TFP growth an inappropriate measure of 
the productivity of researchers. 
This suggests that it is useful to consider other indicators of the productivity of researchers, for 
example, books on new technology or patents, as in Table 7.  Taken at face value, these metrics 
argue for a much less pessimistic view of the ideas production function.15  In the case of the patent 
statistics, the half-life for research productivity is 114 rather than 13 years, and in the case of tech 
books there is no sign of diminishing returns. 
                                                          
12 This is analogous to the impact of raising the savings rate in the Solow growth model. 
13 In Kruse-Andersen’s model, TFP growth converges to half the rate of employment growth.  Compared with 
an average of 1.5 per cent annual increase in potential labour supply over 1950 to 2015, CBO (2016) projects a 
fall to 0.5 per cent over the next 10 years.  If this continues, this model would project TFP growth at 0.25 per 
cent per year in steady-state. 
14 Moore’s Law is an observation that the number of transistors/square inch on an integrated circuit doubles 
every 2 years. 
15 Alexopoulos and Cohen (2011) provide a strong justification for the volume of new technology books as a 
useful indicator of technological progress.  As is well-known, patent statistics are not easy to interpret but they 
probably do indicate an increase in research productivity in the United States since the mid-1980s (Fink et al., 
2016). 
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With regard to the future, a techno-optimistic view would be that in the digital world we can expect 
to see significant and sustained increases in the productivity of R & D.  In particular, it will be 
possible to accumulate and analyze data much more quickly and thoroughly.16  Combined with a 
larger stock of existing knowledge, this will facilitate recombinant innovation, mixing and remixing 
ideas (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014).  In this view, the suggestion that all the low-hanging fruit has 
been picked seems to be the wrong metaphor. 
It seems clear that a model of endogenous growth based on R & D is not consistent with past 
American experience and that there probably have been diminishing returns to R & D.  It is possible, 
however, to believe that these are a good deal less severe than a comparison of TFP with R & D 
expenditure seems to imply so that the positive impact of increase in R & D on productivity growth 
would take quite a long time to evaporate.  A key aspect of the digital revolution is what impact it 
has on the productivity of researchers in future.  If, as techno-optimists hope, this is a big positive 
shock, that may offer an escape route from the productivity slowdown. 
X. Conclusions 
I have reviewed seven hypotheses that might explain the paradox of apparently rapid technological 
progress co-existing with slow productivity growth.  Two of these arguments relate to the strength 
of the evidence for a real and prolonged retardation of productivity growth.  The suggestion that the 
productivity slowdown is a statistical artefact is not convincing even though there is good reason to 
believe that economic growth is underestimated by the national income accounts.  On the other 
hand, econometric analyses which suggest that the slowdown should be seen as a reflection of 
lower trend growth in TFP are probably not a good guide to the future in particular because they 
cannot take account of the prospects for future technological change. 
The other hypotheses seek to explain, rather than to explain away, the productivity slowdown but 
they have differing implications as to whether it is a ‘new normal’ that will prevail over the medium- 
to long-term.  Two, namely, a loss of business dynamism and adverse effects of the financial crisis 
concern the efficient allocation of resources and there is some evidence in favour of both.  The 
former could indicate that the future will be one in which productivity growth continues to be 
impaired whereas the latter is most likely a transitory phenomenon.  With regard to the loss of 
business dynamism, possible symptoms can be seen but it is important to remember that causality 
has not been established and the claim that regulation is to blame remains unproven. 
The final three hypotheses are about the productivity implications of future technological progress 
for which there are a wide range of projections for the medium term ranging from TFP growth of 0.4 
to 2.0 per cent per year.  Pessimistic arguments are of two kinds.  Either the economic impact of 
today’s new technologies will be rather weak or, even more ominously, new ideas have become 
hard to find and the steady-state rate of TFP growth is now very slow by past standards.  A counter 
claim is that technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, robotics, autonomous cars 
etc. have enormous potential but this will take time to materialize.  My reading of the evidence is 
that there is a decent chance that technological progress will deliver a revival of productivity growth 
in the medium term. 
                                                          
16 In the words of Mokyr (2013), “Scientists can now find the tiniest needles in data haystacks as large as 
Montana in a fraction of a second”. 
12 
 
In sum, it seems that the productivity slowdown is real but not necessarily permanent.     
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Table 1.  Growth Rates in Different Periods (% per year) 
 United States 
Real GDP/Person 
United States  
Real GDP/Hour 
Worked 
EU 15  
Real GDP/Person 
EU 15  
Real GDP/Hour 
Worked 
1950-1973 2.5 2.6  4.0 4.9 
1973-1995 1.7 1.3  1.9 2.5 
1995-2007 2.2 2.2  2.0 1.5 
2007-2016 0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.4 
     
2014-2023    1.0 0.8 
2016-2026 1.0 1.4   
 
Note: EU 15 is the aggregate of the 15 EU member states prior to the 2004 expansion of the 
European Union. 
Sources: The Conference Board (2016); Havik et al. (2014); United States Congressional Budget Office 
(2016) 
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Table 2. Contributions to Growth in Market Sector, 1950-2015 (% per year). 
 Education Capital per 
Hour Worked 
TFP Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
France     
1950-1973 0.5 1.7 3.0 5.2 
1973-1995 0.2 1.2 1.5 2.9 
1995-2007 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.9 
2007-2015 0.1 0.7           -0.4 0.4 
Germany     
1950-1973 0.4 2.3 2.5 5.2 
1973-1995 0.3 1.1 1.3 2.7 
1995-2007 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.7 
2007-2015 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.6 
UK     
1950-1973 0.5 1.5 1.4 3.4 
1973-1995 0.4 0.9 1.3 2.6 
1995-2007 0.4 1.2 1.0 2.6 
2007-2015 0.1 0.4           -0.3 0.2 
United States     
1950-1973 0.3 0.9 1.5 2.7 
1973-1995 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.2 
1995-2007 0.3 1.2 1.1 2.6 
2007-2015 0.1 0.8 0.1 1.0 
 
Notes:  
labour productivity is measured in terms of output per hour worked;   
estimates for 2007-15 are for the whole economy; 
the growth accounting equation with which these estimates are derived is ln(Y/L ) =  ln(K/L)  +  
(1  )lnE  +  lnA where E is the educational quality of the labour force and A is total factor 
productivity (TFP).  The method assumes that the data can be viewed as if there is a production 
function Y = AK(LE)1 -  .                                                                                                                                                                           
Sources:   1950-1995: O’Mahony (1999); 1995-2007: van Ark (2011); 2007-15: The Conference Board 
(2016).  Education contributions from 1950-1995 are estimated based on years of schooling in 
Morrisson and Murtin (2009). 
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Table 3.  Estimates of Trend Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 TFP   Y/L   
 2000 2007 2015 2000 2007 2015 
France 0.7 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.5 
Germany 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.2 
UK 1.1 0.0 0.4 2.1 0.9 0.9 
United States 1.1 0.9 0.7 2.0 1.5 1.0 
 
Note: estimates obtained using an HP filter methodology. 
Source: Ollivaud et al. (2016) 
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Table 4.  GPTs: Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 Capital-
Deepening 
TFP Total 
Steam (UK)    
    1760-1830   0.011   0.003   0.014 
    1830-1850 0.16 0.04 0.20 
    1850-1870 0.20 0.21 0.41 
    1870-1910 0.15 0.16 0.31 
Electricity (USA)    
    1899-1919 0.34 0.06 0.40 
    1919-1929 (1) 0.23 0.05 0.28 
    1919-1929 (2) 0.23 0.75 0.98 
ICT (USA)    
    1974-1995 0.41 0.36 0.77 
    1995-2004 0.78 0.72 1.50 
    2004-2012 0.36 0.28 0.64 
 
Memorandum Item: Real Price Falls (%) 
Steam Horsepower  
     1760-1830 39.1 
     1830-1870 60.8 
     1870-1910 50.0 
Electric Motors (Sweden)  
     1901-1925 38.5 
ICT Equipment  
     1970-1989 80.6 
     1989-2007 77.5 
 
Notes:  
Growth accounting estimates except 1919-1929 (2) based on the following equation: 
Δ(Y/L)/(Y/L)  = αΔ(KO/L)/(KO/L)  +  βΔ(KGPT/L)/(KGPT/L) + ω(ΔA/A)GPT  +  φ(ΔA/A)O                                     
This equation decomposes the sources of labour productivity growth into contributions from two 
types of capital, GPT capital and other capital each weighted by their income shares, β and α, and 
two types of TFP growth in the production of GPT equipment and in the rest of the economy, each 
weighted by their shares in gross output, ω and φ.  Thus, the GPT is allowed to have impacts on 
labour productivity growth both through a capital-deepening effect and through own TFP growth. 
1919-1929 (2) includes an additional contribution from TFP spillovers. 
Sources:   
Growth accounting: Crafts (2002) (2004) and Byrne et al. (2013). 
Price falls: Crafts (2004), Edquist (2010) and Oulton (2012) 
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Table 5.  Contributions to TFP Growth in the U. S. Business Sector (% per year) 
a) 1899-1941 
 1929-1941 1899-1941 
TFP Growth 1.86 1.29 
Great Inventions 0.84 (0.35) 0.49 (0.27) 
Other 1.02 (1.51) 0.80 (1.02) 
 
b) 1974-2012 
 1974-1995 1995-2004 2004-2012 1974-2012 
TFP Growth 0.50 1.61 0.34 0.73 
IT Sectors 0.36 0.72 0.28 0.43 
Other 0.14 0.89 0.06 0.30 
 
Note: following Gordon (2016) ‘great inventions’ comprise technology clusters around electricity, 
internal combustion engine, re-arranging molecules, communications & entertainment; figures in 
parentheses re-classify distribution as other. 
Sources: Bakker et al. (2017); Byrne et al. (2013) 
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Table 6.  R & D Expenditure (%GDP) 
 R & D 
(GERD) 
2000 
R & D 
(BERD) 
2000 
R & D 
(GERD) 
2005 
R& D 
(BERD) 
2005 
R & D 
(GERD)  
2015 
R & D 
(BERD) 
 2015 
France 2.08 1.30 2.04 1.27 2.23 1.45 
Germany 2.39 1.68 2.42 1.68 2.87 1.95 
UK 1.64 1.06 1.57 0.96 1.70 1.12 
United States 2.62 1.94 2.51 1.73 2.79 1.99 
 
Sources: OECD (2017) 
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Table 7. R & D and the Production of Ideas in the United States, 1955-2010 (1965 = 100) 
 R & D  (R & D)/GDP (%) New Tech Books Patents 
1955   68.2 1.45 51.8  
1965 100.0 2.72 100.0 100.0 
1980 162.8 2.21 198.1 78.4 
1995 258.1 2.40 301.2 124.2 
2010 375.1 2.73  214.5 
 
Notes: tech books based on titles in the catalogue of the Library of Congress; patents are those of 
domestic origin; all data are 5-year averages. 
Sources: Alexopoulos and Cohen (2011); National Science Foundation (2017); United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (2016) 
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Figure 1.  TFP Growth in the United States: Forecasts versus Outcomes 
 
Source: Crafts and Mills (2017) 
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